Quality and innovation of AFVs determines their success. The T-14 may never be deployed in large numbers, but quantity should not be the marker for success. Meyer’s article focuses on the development of Active Protection Systems and how the Russian development of the ‘Arena’ APS presented a trend which as the article explores, was identified by Western nations, but unlike the ‘Arena’ or the Israeli ‘Trophy’ system, none of these passed the developmental stage. Meyer highlights just how indecisive Western nations are when it comes to armour innovation post-Gulf War. A 1998 article published in Armor by Tom J. In comparison to the Russian resurgence, Western innovation has stalled. 6 Chiefly, the T-14 programme highlights a resurgence in Russian armoured innovation which had stagnated since the economic downturn of the Cold War. 5 Similar to examples of ambitious military programmes cancelled due to economic factors, lessons can be learned from the T-14 programme. The Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Yury Borisov stated in July that a unit cost of $4m was high enough to force the Russian military to reconsider mass production of the tank, instead stating that focusing on the T-72B3 programme would secure a long-term competitor to equivalent NATO tanks. The T-14 should not be dismissed purely because the programme may never develop into a fully-fledged mainstay of the Russian military. The core problem with this argument is that it undervalues what the T-14 represents outside of an operational capacity. 4Ĭost has been one of the main arguments against large scale deployment of the T-14. 3 This can be further supported by the use of AFVs in Syria and Iraq, providing an example of how innovations such as homemade modifications and vehicles are of immense value to armies with limited manpower. Searle continues, arguing that ‘wherever armies are not in a position to rely on vast and expandable infantry forces, armour will remain as the key component in their force structures. The employment of heavy armoured forces in the fighting in Eastern Ukraine since 2014 is but one example of the continued use of mechanised units in Europe 2. As Alaric Searle notes in his 2017 work, Armoured Warfare, continue Russian emphasis on the development of armoured forces is well founded:ĭespite the rise of helicopters and ATGMs, the future of the tank and its mechanised support vehicles does not appear to be in any great danger as the most important weapons system in ground warfare. This viewpoint is not limited to just to the T-14, moreover it can be applied to armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) as a whole. ![]() Rather, the aim was to provide an example of how NATO is losing ground to those willing to innovate, regardless of whether such innovations, like the T-14, are widely adopted. The cost and manufacturing factors are both valid but did not fall within the scope of the article. Much of the criticism of the article came from the conclusion that a lack of credible information and statistics on the cost and numbers of T-14s in Russian service reduced the aim of the article to fearmongering and misinformation. This article will not be an evaluation of NATO or Russian doctrine, but an explanation of how the T-14 represents a technical progression in armoured warfare which NATO is currently lagging behind in. My previous article ‘Has the T-14 Changed the Game?’ did not seek to provide an in-depth comparison of how the T-14 outmatched contemporary NATO tanks detail for detail, nor did it seek to advertise the T-14 as the modern-day Tiger 1. To dismiss the T-14 main battle tank (MBT) as a capable piece of hardware by claiming high cost prohibits widespread deployment is risky. Why the T-14 Armata presents a threat, regardless of operational capacity
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